The focus of this issue is the changing nature of military conflict and its implications for peacemaking. Our opening article by Lord Rowan Williams examines the moral landscape of ‘new wars’ and suggests some appropriate responses and ways to improve global governance. His approach raises questions about the definition of ‘war’ and its relationship with the Just War; and perhaps even our understanding of the term ‘pacifism’.

The international page is a personal testimony about the humanitarian implications of the emerging South Sudan conflict, a ‘new war’ in a brand new country.

‘New wars’ occur mainly within states; they are complex, fought for a wide variety of reasons and involve many different types of actor often without legitimate authority. Consequently interstate wars of the 21st century are of little value when understanding their origins and seeking to prevent them. We explore the politics issues surrounding WW1 history and ask why it is producing so much media coverage. We suggest that the peace movement’s response to the WW1 controversies should be a critical awareness and a focus on personal stories. Special attention is drawn to the ‘Choices’ – programme for schools designed by the Peace Museum.

Tony Kempster

War – a changing moral map

Defining the ‘new wars’

Professor Mary Kaldor has made us familiar with the idea of ‘new wars’. She has proposed a definition of the ways in which war at the moment is radically different from war as classically conceived in both strategic and moral writings.

I begin with some thoughts on her concept of ‘new war’. I will move on to recap some of the basic principles of classical Just War theory, to ask what the priorities and principles might have to offer to an international climate in which war is indeed not quite what it used to be.

Mary Kaldor emphasises most of all that armed conflict these days sees a radical confusion between state and non-state agents - therefore between public and private agents - an unclarity about where the internal and the external start and stop and a blurring of the boundaries between war and crime. By this she means that the characteristic armed conflicts of the last perhaps 20 years have not been in any sense wars that follow the definition taken for granted in most ethical discussion before the late 20th century. These are not primarily conflicts between sovereign states; they are quite hard to pin down to specific acts of aggression by one sovereign state against another; they are very seldom ended by anything resembling a classical treaty; and the way in which they are conducted has involved massive overriding of human rights and random violence against civilians on what is probably not an unprecedented, but certainly on a troubling scale.

I want to refine that very slightly by suggesting that ‘new wars’ fall under two rather distinct heads. A great deal of what Mary Kaldor writes about is to do with internecine conflicts (civil conflict) within states or within regions. How does one, for example, classify the ongoing conflict involving the Lord’s Resistance Army in central and east Africa? In no sense, is it a classical war situation yet it is the major destabilising factor in many countries in central and east Africa. The other sort of new war is what...
There is always an alternative to violent response to violent initiatives.

Deploying the Just War theory

I want to approach this by looking at the Just War theory itself first, and drawing out what I believe to be its five main assumptions and priorities. Classical Just War theory, as emerging in the Middle Ages, makes a variety of conditions to be met. And, although they have sometimes been deployed rather mechanically in discussion of recent conflict, I believe they embody a set of assumed moral priorities.

The first of these might be put very simply by saying there is always an alternative to violent response to violent initiatives. Just War theory assumes that armed response is a last resort: it begins by encouraging you to look at what you might do other than fighting. There is no law of nature which dictates that there should be a violent response to violent initiatives elsewhere. And for that to work effectively there needs to be clarity on authority; again a principle of classical Just War theory is that the war be declared by a legitimate authority. You don't simply decide that this is going to be a just conflict if you are leading a war band, you ask the king or his council. But that might be rephrased as saying that what the Just War process takes for granted is that there is some public discernment about the alternatives to violence.

These first two principles are accepted on a further assumption (third principle) that violence is undesirable in itself; that the risk to non-combatants and innocent bystanders is to be avoided as far as humanly possible. The protection of the innocent is a major ethical principle in this connection. All this leads on to a fourth point that there are going to be limits to what counts as a defensible response. Once again the classical theory assumes you cannot do anything to impede your enemy. It may be a highly effective short term response to slaughter the inhabitants of a village as an example, but it is not a defensible one. The protection of the innocent dictates that there are limits to what counts as a legitimate response. And that in itself further takes for granted the fifth and final principle, that the entire framework represented by classical Just War theory is intolerant of aggression in any form.

So we have five building blocks for an ethical approach. Step back from the detail, and sometimes from the rather nitpicking detail, of whether this or that conflict fulfills the classical criteria of Just War and these are the broader issues which seem to emerge. If we are to frame an adequate response to the realities and threats of contemporary conflict, we need to clarify these principles and see if it is possible to define what law governed states these days still wish to take for granted. If we were to come to our existing situation with something like that ethical consensus in our minds and hearts, what sort of issues might just come up in political and international practice?

Let me frame a few points that come up in relation to this. The first is a venerable ethical principle first articulated with clarity by St Augustine in the 5th century. He elaborates in his great work, The City of God, elaborates that you will de-legitimise your own polity if you react to crisis with illegal methods. He believes, of course, that the highest form of laws applies to the Christian community, where everyone else's interest is everyone else's interest; a community in which there is no toxic and murderous rivalry between elements of that community. States approximate to that level of legitimacy and authority to very different degrees. When the state fails short, it may be subverted by deliberately suspending the common good, for any reason and particularly when suspending the public good deliberately in some way, the Church has the right and duty to hold the state accountable to this.

A second point that comes into focus here is more complex and a little more delicate to handle. Political sovereignty is something that we think is simple and in practice is complicated. What constitutes a violation of or a surrender of sovereignty? We assume that Just War theory is about defined sovereign units in some sort of competition or conflict. But in the new war environment what exactly does sovereignty mean? If there are issues that are not simply about the relations of sovereign states then the law and polity of any one state is not going to be adequate to deal with the issues raised. In other words the state may have to re-discover its understanding of sovereignty to other bodies; it must yield its absolute claim to determine how to conduct its own security policy. It is to do with the authority of the International Criminal Court, the role of the UN and the Security Council, and what exactly the force is of those recommendations and conventions which surround this issue to do with taking council, gaining consent, gaining consensus about different sorts of interventionist action and so on.

Let us go back to central and east Africa. How does one gain consensus about different sorts of intervention? One way is to turn to in framing some way of making sense of containing violence in the world as it now is? There is a sense in which the map of armed conflict in the 21st century has a number of fresh features which require us to think very hard indeed about the moral context within which we approach conflict. Most of this is essentially a crisis of legality or legitimacy. If we are talking about non-state agents, who has the authority that was once recognised in sovereign state in terms of the declaration and management of war? If we are talking methods of warfare, is it to restrict the range of legitimate action, the legitimate levels of violence in conflict? If we are talking about the goals of conflict and what brings conflict to an end, who has the authority to broker and enforce, and define in advance, what counts as winning.

Then there is a subsidiary question about what we are defending when we respond to violent initiatives elsewhere. What is the risk involved in supposing that the new climate of armed conflict allows us to sideline or suspend the rule of law in certain respects when it comes to major challenges to security through terrorism, a doctrine, of course, articulated very clearly by some in the US administration in the last 10 to 15 years? So what are the moral points of reference that we might want to turn to in framing some way of making sense of containing violence in the world as it now is?

Two

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Mary Kaldor

might be called interventionist force. That is the attempt to solve the problems of a destabilised or failing state from outside, sometimes hooked on to concepts of self defence, sometimes hooked on to concepts on what is now generally known as the Duty to Protect. Besides this fine tuning, there are a couple of other matters which are worth mentioning here. With interventionist force, we are normally talking about massive technological imbalance between combatant parties; for example, about drone warfare which creates moral questions of its own. We might also say that in the world generally defined by the words "war on terrorism", the goals of particular actions of force are always going to be revisable because it is not at all clear what will constitute victory. There is a sense therefore in which strategy and policy are going to be reactive in that context, revisable in the light of circumstance, in a way very strange to classical Just War theory. And there is also the unresolved question of what is now, in a complex interlocking world, a credible legitimate authority for taking violent action or forceful intervention.

There are two other issues. The first is the present reality and future likelihood of resource war; the very probable prediction that in the next generation major conflicts will be over scarce resources of food and more predictable water. This is one of the largely unnoticed factors in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which is going to be regionally a major question within the next few decades. The other specific issue, not unique to new wars but which has perhaps achieved a new kind of prominence and focus, is the habitual use of child soldiering and rape. These factors which play a large part in a wide range of inter-ethnic conflicts in parts of the world are now generally regarded as tools of war and habits of war. This is something which ought to cause some profound moral concern.

So I think Professor Kaldor is onto something. There is a sense in which the map of armed conflict in the 21st century has a number of fresh features which require us to think very hard indeed about the moral context within which we approach conflict. Most of this is essentially a crisis of legality or legitimacy. If we are talking about non-state agents, who has the authority that was once recognised in sovereign state in terms of the declaration and management of war? If we are talking methods of warfare, is it to restrict the range of legitimate action, the legitimate levels of violence in conflict? If we are talking about the goals of conflict and what brings conflict to an end, who has the authority to broker and enforce, and define in advance, what counts as winning.

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Continued on page one

Continued on page eleven
Not so ‘new war’ after all?

I would like to use the opportunity of my report to comment on Lord Williams’ stimulating lecture which opens this issue of TAP.

Lord Williams draws heavily on Professor Kaldor’s concept of ‘new war’. She proposes a definition of the ways in which today’s wars are radically (my italics) different from war as classically conceived in both strategic and moral writings. Lord Williams offers some thoughts on this definition before accepting its premise in today’s international climate as one in which ‘war is indeed not quite what it used to be’.

An initial reaction is to ask how Kaldor’s thesis compares with Professor Steven Pinker’s argument in The better angels of our nature: why violence has declined? Pinker argues that violence has declined over the last millennia. He looks similarly to the last few decades of the 20th Century and comes to a different conclusion to Kaldor. He calls this time ‘The new peace’.

According to Pinker, organized conflicts of all kinds including genocides and civil wars have declined throughout the world. Drawing primarily on Kaldor’s work, Williams perhaps unwittingly, continues the very subtle spread of fear which is inevitable when talking not only about war and our response to conflict, but its sudden – if we are to believe Kaldor’s thesis - mutation into something that is new and therefore unknown: ‘new war’ becomes something else to be afraid of and to arm ourselves against.

I have two other reflections on this lecture: the first being the resemblances between ‘new war’ and empire building and maintenance; the second is Lord Williams’ approach to making moral judgements about war.

My main argument with Kaldor’s ‘new war’, as used by Lord Williams, is that she is describing something that has occurred throughout history, in particular where there existed massive imbalances in power and military might. Lord Williams breaks down her definition of “new war” into two categories - civil conflict and interventionist force. I don’t think these are new features. They may not fit against the traditional battles between sovereign European states, but go back to the spread of powerful empires (or look to the current US Empire, or even the British Empire); and they bare all the hall marks of the so called ‘new war’ Kaldor describes. Theologian Klaus Wengst in his book Pax Romana and the Peace of Jesus Christ helpfully describes some of the features of the Roman Empire, many of which correspond to the definition of ‘new war’. Wengst argues that ‘Peace’ was the decisive and most important sign of the Roman Empire, particularly during the reign of Caesar Augustus. Peace and security in this scheme was secured principally for those “from above” and achieved through military means at the expense of peoples conquered on the frontiers. The Pax Romana, therefore, seeks peace as a political goal but one which is brought about through successful wars on the periphery. Could these be described as interventionist? I believe so; as they, like now, are characterised by massive technological imbalances between combatant parties as Lord Williams describes. Roman power offered security; paid for by tribute by those within its borders receiving protection from outside threat. These conquered tribes were now ‘free’ and could enjoy life undisturbed.

The battle for resources is a present and looming fear within Lord Williams’ speech and again this is nothing new as he comments in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For the Pax Romana, the security and peace of the powerful was maintained by the economic contributions from the provinces: their conquest resulting in their ongoing exploitation. But conflict that once existed on the frontiers, now becomes ‘civil’ within the empire, when a once subjugated people begins to rise militarily to claim back that which once belonged solely to them or in the case of the Jewish people, in an attempt to fulfill one of the narratives in the Old Testament – the overthrow of the pagan enemies of God through the coming Messiah.

Using the region of Judaea to highlight this point on ‘civil’ conflict, Jesus’ death along with the thousands of others was part of wider system of control and the spreading of fear: the suppression of threat in order to maintain the ‘peace’ and ‘security’ of the Empire. The civil conflict with Judea erupted at several points from 4BC until the 2nd century when the third Jewish Revolt, led by Bar Kochba, was finally annihilated, along with $580,000 Jews, 50 fortified towns and 985 villages: this is the price for ‘peace’ from the underside of Empire and the only place from which to begin our moral reflections on war. It is impossible in Christian terms to make a moral judgement on war without first looking to Jesus Christ, who himself was killed as a rebel and threat to the Pax Romana. As God takes on flesh and suffers as one on the ‘underside’ so must our reflections on war begin here also. Beginning a moral reflection with the classical Just War Theory, as Lord Williams does, is insufficient. It is a voice and luxury of the powerful at the expense of the powerless as it has been throughout history. Theologian Mark L. Taylor puts it starkly, “Jesus died the victim of executions with Imperial Power. There is an inescapable opposition between the life and death of Jesus, and Imperial Power. To embrace and love the executed God is to be in resistance to empire. To be a follower of the executed Jesus of Nazareth is to venture down a road without having a place in the system of Imperial control.”

It is here that a radical distinction must be made and it brings me on to my third argument. It is clear that the Just War Theory has become the predominant position of many Churches across all denominational boundaries with the exception of the Mennonite and Anabaptist Churches. The Anglican Church uses the three-fold basis of Scripture, Reason and Tradition in seeking a common mind. Regrettably, there is little Scripture in Lord Williams’ lecture beginning as it does with classical Just War Theory. For truly Christian ethical discussion, greater weight must be placed on Scripture, as the place where Reason and Tradition need to be sifted against. The issue then arises how is Scripture authoritative? As the Bible is made up of many different narratives, a very positive move called a Narrative theology has emerged during the last century which seeks to help the individual Christian or Church community find its place within the wider Christian story and therefore to imagine afresh how to act in the light of this story.

In this schema, the Bible isn’t authoritative of and by itself, thereby avoiding those unhelpful proof texts, but the Christian story becomes a historical search as the story looks forward and back to the person of Jesus Christ which then becomes authoritative for the moral life of the believer. A Christian imagination reminds us of our death with Christ in our baptism and our new life in the Holy Spirit with the ensuing envisioning of new possibilities for faithfulness, especially in times of gross discrepancies in wealth distribution and the amassing of arms at the expense of agricultural development for the poor.

In the face of the predominant story told by the Just War Theory, it is time for a new story and a new imagination. The Theory, however finely conceived, cannot serve as a critique for gross economic injustices or offer the positive societal changes needed in our time in the face of external threats. I believe that the new story is really an old story that needs, not so much dusting off, but a people who are called to re-imagine what living faithfully to the way of Jesus looks like; to live without fear of the enemy as locally conceived and to live without the need of arms and to imagine the only way to secure a safe future for the next generations of the human race.
2003 was a year of seeds, yet to germinate

FROM THE GENERAL SECRETARY
TONY KEMPSTER GIVES HIS REPORT

FOUR

If 2011 was easily identifiable as a year when the geopolitical world had shifted on its axis thanks to the Arab Spring, and 2012 was all about highly successful London Olympic Games, 2013 could be remembered as one without obvious themes. This was the year of seeds yet to germinate.

In May, the dramatic leak of the CIA contractor Edward Snowden threw a spotlight on the unresolved tensions in Western societies between state security and individual privacy; these being tensions that those states in which he would go on to seek sanctuary avoid mainly by wholly sacrificing privacy. Mr Snowden’s ultimate defection to Russia provided a publicity coup for Vladimir Putin in a year when Russia displays of musculantry were on a soaring rise. For Russia, perhaps 2013 was the year in which Putin finally abandoned any pretence of democratic liberalism in favour of authoritarian Russian nationalism.

Globally, the new clout of Russia was best seen in Mr Putin’s successful stymieing of any efforts to curtail the slaughter in Syria – a classic new war. There an uprising has evolved beyond a civil war into a multi-faceted bloodbath, a classic ‘new war’ in Mary Kaldor’s terms. In August and September, after the regime of Bashar Assad was revealed to have used chemical weapons, proposals for direct intervention were defeated both by the British House of Commons and the US congress. A Putin-backed deal to destroy the Assad chemical arsenal followed, highlighting both Russia’s new confidence in its global role and a profound sense of crisis in the West about its own. The West’s decision to avoid the use military force was undoubtedly right but there was confusion in the way it came about. This needs to be examined because the West lost much credibility in the eyes of the world, particularly as the threat of a ‘new war’ in Mary Kaldor’s terms. In August and September, after the regime of Bashar Assad was revealed to have used chemical weapons, proposals for direct intervention were defeated both by the British House of Commons and the US congress. A Putin-backed deal to destroy the Assad chemical arsenal followed, highlighting both Russia’s new confidence in its global role and a profound sense of crisis in the West about its own. The West’s decision to avoid the use military force was undoubtedly right but there was confusion in the way it came about. This needs to be examined because the West lost much credibility in the eyes of the world, particularly as the threat of a ‘new war’ in Mary Kaldor’s terms.

The eventful outcome of the flurry of activity after the Gouta gas attack could be an encouraging precedent. The threat of an American military action led last September to a joint US-Russian initiative to disarm the Assad regime of chemical weapons, one that defied the predictions of immediate failure. We now have evidence of a shocking violation of human rights by the Syrian regime, compelling evidence of the systematic murder of 11,000 detainees through starvation, beatings and torture – and all that in just one part of the country, with international agencies telling us they fear this is merely the tip of a large and gruesome iceberg.

The ‘choices’ project which I believe exhibits some excellent features for teaching about WW1. ‘Choices’ is a cross phase differentiated WW1 resource for primary schools, secondary schools and colleges. It explores the choices and consequences that faced people during WW1 and now in the 21st century with the ‘war on terrorism’. The resource focuses on the stories of peacemakers, as well as those who fought in WW1, days that changed the world and peace and conflict today. It comprises: (1) a 98 page book containing a teacher’s guide, stories and background information; (2) integrated comprehensive humanities, citizenship, English, ICT, SMSC) medium-term plans; (3) a CD ROM containing copies of primary sources and untold stories from the Peace Museum’s collection for teaching and learning; and activity templates and pro-formas for reproduction and use in the classroom.

‘Choices’ has been designed to enable their students to (1) reflect on experiences, (2) use informed judgements to make appropriate choices, (3) recognise that choices have actions and consequences, (4) identify and feel confident in discussing and challenging issues, extremist ideologies and in challenging prejudice, inequalities, stereotypes and misconceptions, (5) recognise where extreme ideas and propaganda may be a goal of content and (6) suggest
alternative non-violent ways to respond to difference and conflict.

‘Choices’ will be trailed in January and the revised edition will be available to buy @ £19.99 plus pp. An interactive free web-based resource is now available at www.choicesandnow.co.uk. This will allow teachers to add their own ideas and share the resources in schools. It incorporates a student blog and a ‘My story’ section. Independent evaluation procedures are in place.

Go to www.choicesandnow.co.uk for information. CPD for educators is available for schools or groups of schools and Choices is not being used for teachers training courses or several colleges.

The National Theatre production of Michael Morpurgo’s ‘War horse’ will be at the Alhambra (Bradford) in June and includes some increasingly aware that when people leave the theatre after this production, that they are moved and often have many new questions about war and peace. Michael Morpurgo is also apparently intrigued by the idea of Bradford having presented in the only peace museum in the country. As a result they have proposed that the Museum would be a partner for the duration of the production and offer workshops for the days that have matinee productions for groups both at the Museum and the Alhambra Studios, based on ‘Choices’.

Debate about the design of the new £2 coin

The Royal Mint’s has stated that the first coins with a design to commemorate the first world war would feature the image of Lord Kitchener with the familiar wording “Your Country Needs You”. While the Mint described the image as ‘powerful’ and instantly recognisable, it has been criticised by some in the peace movement and others for being jingoistic and glorifying war. The following are links to two pieces about this, both with links at the bottom to an online petition calling for the coins not to be put into circulation.


Article by Symon Hill on Ekklesia: http://www.ekklesia.co.uk/node/19818.

Comment from Fellowship of Reconciliation: http://www.for.org.uk/2014/01/06/coins-ploughshares

Some further points related to Lord Williams’ lecture

During the questions session, in response to a point about the non-violence of Jesus and the early Christians, Lord Williams made it clear that he was not speaking from a pacifist position. Although he would like to be a pacifist, he said he believed that Christians had an intellectual responsibility to do what they consider to be ethically most helpful for the human good when dealing with the complexity of specific strategic debates. He said: “I am not willing to simply pass the ball sideways and leave it to others to make the difficult complex moral decisions. (He did not say how he defined “pacifist”).

But there is no doubt that Lord Williams lecture does squeeze every ounce out of the presumption against the use of violence in the Just War tradition whenever this is possible. He leaves little room between the Just War tradition as properly applied and the pacifist stance.

When someone in the audience said “But surely so-called ‘new war’ always been with us” (the point rose in our chairperson report on page 3), Lord Williams said this is certainly the case but there is a significant change in degree, as they are becoming more common. Further, we are moving on from the neat narrative of traditional Just War discussion to something which is more complex.

The discussion about ‘new war’ does raise a question concerning where the definition of ‘war’ begins and ends. Can we use the term when dealing with criminal or terrorist activities? Are these not essentially policing actions rather than wars per se? If so this has implications for the way the AIP pledge, written as it was between two major interstate wars is understood. How we take the term conscientious objection might also be brought into contention. Clearly this is an area where pacifists may take differing positions. (The shorter OED defines pacifism as the doctrine or belief that it is desirable and possible to settle international disputes by peaceful means.)

‘New war’ and our political nature

My working career was in animal breeding and I have retained a interest in the field of genetics as it has developed dramatically over the past 20 years. One thing becoming clear is that the way we think and even our political nature is influenced more than was previously thought by our genes. Perhaps the nature of ‘new war’ should encourage us to look again at the view expressed in the (1986) UNESCO ‘Seville Statement on violence’ that war is a product of culture and we have no genetic tendency to violence.

In our political nature: the evolutionary origins of what divides us (Prometheus Books, 2013), Avi Tuschman brings together a lot of new information and places it into the context of anthropology and neuroscience to reveal the roots of some of our deeply held moral values. He casts new light on the ideological clashes that so dangerously divide and imperil our world today and takes issue with the Seville Statement. He argues that the authors of the statement committed a textbook case of the ‘moralistic fallacy’: they declared that the way they believed the world should be is the way the world actually is. In his chapter ‘The biology of war and genocide’ he explains why the world actually isn’t the way the Seville Statement claimed it should be.

Taking the arguments in wider context, it is interesting to ask whether pacifism and a preference to non-violence responses to war are not to some extent genetically controlled. For anyone wishing to understand the issues, this is an essential read and we would be interested in any view our readers may have.

Adam Hochschild (2011)

To end all wars: a story of protest and patriotism in the First World War

Pan Books

This history book by Adam Hochschild (2012), focuses on those who, often at great personal cost, protested against the war. Following a diverse group of characters connected by blood ties, close friendships or personal enemies – from feminists and philosophers to trade unionists and aristocrats – Hochschild captures a Britain fractured by the seismic upheaval of the Great War. And shows how WW1 was fought not only in the trenches of the Western Front, but at home, between brothers and sisters, mothers and daughters, families and friends, who found themselves in opposite sides. This is a unique history of the war, featuring a cast of characters more revealing than any but the greatest novelists could invent, including generals, trade unionists, feminists, agent provocateurs and soldiers.

FIVE
SOUTH SUDAN: AN INTIMATE EXPERIENCE

Article by APF vice-chairperson, Sue Claydon

The morning of Sunday, 15 December, dawned in Juba as they all do at this time of year – sunny and hot. I had returned from Nairobi the day before, and at about 11 am I headed down to Yei with three colleagues from IPCS (the local NGO with which I had a placement). As we drove along it was a typical Sunday morning. People were shopping, cooking beside the roads, going to and from church. There was no indication that 12 hours later a spark would ignite a surge of violence to throw the newest country in the world into chaos in many places.

Two of our IPCS colleagues had stayed behind. On Monday morning my neighbour (a UN Police Adviser from Nepal) knocked on my door to tell me about the fighting in Juba overnight, there was a dispute in the Presidential Guard. I tried to contact my colleagues, but all the phone networks in Juba were down. The radio was only playing music (never a good sign). Life in Yei went on normally. Throughout the day we heard reports and that evening the President appeared in military uniform, something he never does, to say a coup had failed.

Early the next morning my colleague left in Juba finally got through to me. We spoke for over ten minutes and it took all my control not to cry into the phone, because all I could hear in the background was constant gun fire. This sound in your ear is very different from when you hear it on the TV. Yei was still calm and so the College Principle and I kept an arranged meeting with the Principal of the Reconcile Peace Institute.

Later in the day, news reports were bringing out more details. All our VSO colleagues in Juba had been ordered into ‘hibernation’ (no movement) on the Monday and there was no way to get anyone out. A 6 pm to 6 am curfew was in place. The US then ordered all its citizens to leave South Sudan, not just Juba. The fighting spread to the states of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile.

One of our IPCS colleagues, working on a justice project, was ‘caught’ in Akobo when fighting broke out there. With many others, he sought shelter in the UN compound. First reports from him were OK. Then on Thursday I received this text “So far four or more Indian peacekeepers killed. A number of Dinkas and Nuer dead. It is just God who rescued me. Keep praying coz I am not sure of the level of my safety.” It was not until two days later I received another text telling me he was safe in Malakal and had got out of Akobo just before the violence erupted there. I do not believe I will ever receive another text that will bring me as much joy.

Parts of the country were clearly in a war situation. Meanwhile, in Yei things continued as normal with the only sounds heard from my office window were those of the bleating goats that had returned to the anthill and children’s voices (as it was the long school holiday). Then suddenly it was difficult to buy air time for your phone. People were staying in compounds after 6 pm with things just a bit subdued. VSO then decided to evacuate all its volunteers from South Sudan; the recommendations from all governments were now for their citizens to leave. The next two days I tried to tie up all the ‘loose ends’. I met with the Bishop who said that it was hoped Yei would remain calm. Like all those I spoke with, he was distressed that the country, for which they had suffered so much, was going through these trials again. “We do not want to return to the bush”, he told me.

Leaving is never easy under these circumstances it was heart-breaking. People could not believe I was going when we were so far from the trouble. The airstrip at Yei is just a dirt track surrounded by palm trees; it would make a good film set. Waiting for the plane to land seemed very surreal. Suddenly in a very small way I knew what it is like to be a refugee. However, I was headed home and not to an overcrowded compound with no resources as thousands of others in South Sudan were doing.

While writing this, I have just heard on the news of a ferry capsizing in the White Nile and over 200 drowning. Each day the news continues to bring information about places that mean little to those listening to the BBC, but so much to anyone who has lived in South Sudan. While I have shared my personal experiences, I feel I should also comment on some of the facts. The reason for this will be clear later in this piece.

“Our people are dying all over, and for what?” Daniel Deng Bul, the Episcopal Archbishop of South Sudan, asked at New Year.

With the exception of a few years in the late 70s and early 80s, the people of what is now South Sudan have experienced nothing but war. When you have a society that has experienced nearly a half century of armed conflict with everything invested just in the armed groups and no civil society to speak of (other than the churches), a mentality comes to dominate how things are done.

The facts of the present situation are complicated as might be expected. In July, President Salva Kiir sacked his cabinet, including Vice President Riek Machar. In the build up to the elections in 2015, there has been jockeying for power in the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement, the political party that grew out of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army. The fact that Kiir is a member of the Dinka tribe and Machar from the rival Nuer has been made much of but the ethnic tension go well beyond two men. They have been simmering below the surface. This is country with 2.5 small arms for every man and child. The ‘rebels’ are a very loose grouping of military defectors, warlords, ethnic militias and anyone who wants to take advantage of the situation. This is the legacy of war and the two years of independence have not addressed it.

To answer Archbishop Daniel’s question, it is political power that needs to be sorted democratically, but in a country only used to military operations, this is a challenge. Once the political situation is sorted, many feel the ethnic tensions will ease.

Yeji Cathedral on Christmas morning 2013. Over a thousand people gathered for prayers vigils for peace. This has been followed by many prayer vigils for peace throughout South Sudan. The South Sudanese never lost their trust in God throughout decades of war and continue to trust in him.

So, how do I feel now? My heart continues to remain in Yei with the people there and with all those in South Sudan.

SIX

‘My heart continues to remain in Yei with the people there and with all those in South Sudan.’
Margaret MacMillan (2013)
The war that ended peace
Profile Books
MacMillan’s title draws attention to the fact that Europe has not seen a major war for decades. The opening chapters sound one of the books major themes – the fact that alliances conceived as defensive by those who make them can easily appear offensive to others. Readers will also find excellent accounts of popular jingoism, the yellow press and the hardening of national stereotypes in these years as well as both militarism and the peace movements that opposed it.
Who was to blame for the Great War? Or was no one to blame for the fact that, after a century of extraordinary progress, Europe marched into a catastrophic conflict with killed millions of men, bled its economies dry, shook empires and societies to pieces, and fatally undermined its dominance in the world.
To understand why Europeans turned their backs on peace, we must also understand their world, from its assumptions to its institutions. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, and ending with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, historian Margaret MacMillan sketches the vast political and technological transformations which Europe underwent in the years before the Great War and provides a definitive account of the ideas and emotions that crossed borders, and the national decisions that tipped the balance between peace and war. And she brings to life the individuals who had to make the choices between war and peace, in their strengths and weaknesses, their loves, hatreds and – just as importantly – their small moments of human muddle and weakness.
In a time like our own, which faces similar consequences of the war, the causes have always been contentious. The victorious allies, of course, stuck the blame on Germany at Versailles. Revisionist accounts have blamed Britain and France’s encirclement of Germany. Today the consensus seems to be that there is no consensus. Although declining to attribute explicit blame to the Kaiser, MacMillan suggests that they alone had the power to prevent disaster in July 1914, but didn’t exercise it.
Christopher Clark (2012)
The sleepwalkers: how Europe went to war in 1914
Penguin
Drawing on new scholarship, Clark offers a fresh look at WW1, focusing not on the battles and atrocities of the war itself, but on the complex events and relationships that led a group of well-meaning leaders into brutal conflict. The arguments in this superb account of the causes of the First World War are so compelling that they effectively consign the historical consensus to the bin… Christopher Clark argues that the statesmen of 1914 were “sleepwalkers, watchful but unseeing, haunted by dreams, yet blind to the reality of the horror they were about to bring into the world”. He changes the balance between the great power dissonance and the disputes on Europe’s fault line, the Balkans by placing them centre stage. Clark refuses to play the blame game, arguing that the Germans were not alone in their paranoid imperialism. The more convincing and terrifying reality is that no nation really meant to wage war, but each sleepwalked into it. Clark brilliantly puts this illogical conflict into context, showing how pre 1914 Europe was inherently unstable and riven by ethnic and nationalistic factions. He argues that war emerged from a complex conjunction of factors, each of which was far from inevitable and in many cases improbable, often because it involved decision makers who behaved less than fully rationally. They indulged in illusions of power, stereotypes about their enemies, and outmoded conceptions of sovereignty. In all this the leaders were sleepwalkers, generally unaware of the horrific consequences of the war they were about to unleash. This interpretation not only captures trends in modern historiography on the Great War but also highlighting striking similarities with (and a few differences from) the decision-making that has led to recent wars.
David Reynolds (2013)
The long shadow: the Great War and the twentieth Century
Simon and Schuster
Reynolds takes on the myths surrounding the war (see our article on 1914 and all that on page 10). He argues that in Britain, we have lost touch with the Great War. It has become a national myth – a futile bloodbath in the mud of Flanders and the Somme, a holocaust of young men cut off in their prime for no evident purpose, a story narrated by Wilfred Owen, and a handful of war poets. But by reducing the conflict to personal tragedies, however moving, we have lost the big picture: the history has been distilled into poetry. A J Taylor’s best-seller, The First World War: an illustrated history (1963) contributed to this. The force of that book stemmed from Taylor’s argument that the war had a dawning simplicity; it was pointless. He revealed not ‘a good war’ like the Second, but an utterly senseless one. The mud has stuck. Reynolds seeks to broaden our vision by assessing the impact of the Great War across the twentieth century. He also shows how events in that turbulent century – particularly 1939-45, the Cold War and the collapse of communism – shaped and reshaped attitudes to 1914-18. The long shadow takes apart a big subject, and puts it back together, clearly and judiciously. The British were distinctive in their experience both of the war and the post-war impacts. Britain also stands out in the way that it has remembered the conflict in public culture. All this contrasts with the broad patterns of experience and memorialisation on the continent. For the British, 1914-18 has become a problem that will not go away. Its vexed interpretation is wrapped up with many ongoing debates, including the UK’s troubled relationship with the European Union. A century on, we should be capable of understanding that it is a mistake to view the two world wars as belonging to entirely different moral orders because we recoil from the horrors of the Western Front, and are deluded into supposing them historically unique.
DIARY OF EVENTS

LOCAL AND NATIONAL

Congratulations to the Fellowship of Reconciliation on its 100th Anniversary.
Note the anniversary events below.

14 to 16 February  Fellowship of Reconciliation conference on active non-violent peacemaking (with SCM). www.for.org.uk
5 March  An annual liturgy and witness of Repentance and Resistance to nuclear war preparations outside the Ministry of Defence, London. Details from info@paxchristi.org.uk
14 April  Global Day of Action on Military Spending. Go to www.demilitarize.org.uk
15 May  International Conscientious Objectors’ Day. Ceremony in Tavistock Square, London. edna.mathieson1@btinternet.com. Also the launch date for Quaker activities commemorating WW1.
17 to 23 May  Fellowship of Reconciliation week on Iona focussed on peace and reconciliation. www.for.org.uk
28 July  Centenary of the outbreak of WW1.

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Pictured are (from left to right): The Rev. David Mumford (APF GB member), Morag Dale, Philip Potter, Kay Potter, Gill McKnight, Beryl White and Doug White.

International Peace day prayers

Prayers were said that conflicts could be resolved without resorting to violence, particularly Syria. Nine out of ten deaths in modern armed conflict are civilian and half of these are children. Innocent victims of war and those forced to become refugees were especially mentioned in the intercessions.

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Then please (/) box one in the form below.

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The railway man (2013)
Directed by Jonathan Teplitzky
The story of Eric Lomax, a signals engineer who was forced to work on the infamous Thai-Burmese ‘Death Railway’ after being taken prisoner by the Japanese during the Second World War, has been told several times before, in print and on screen. The latest retelling wrestles with themes of suffering and redemption as it cross-over between Colin Firth’s ageing Lomax living a purgatorial existence in late 20th century Britain and an embattled young soldier suffering at the hands of his wartime captors.

But there is a shadow in the last pages of the book (upon which the film is based) which looms dark. When Eric went to Japan with Nagase, he asked to see the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, the memorial, dedicated to the worship of those who fought for the Emperor, but at another it is an unashamed celebration of militarism. In the grounds you can find a monument to the Kempeitai – it is like seeing a memorial to the Gestapo in a German Cathedral and the first engine that ran on the Thai-Burmese railway.

The dangerous drums of nationalism are beginning to beat again. Mr Shinzo Abe, the Japanese prime minister, has, according to the Chinese, asked to see the Yasukuni Shrine in Japan, which is on the grounds of the shrine, is a war memorial, dedicated to the worship of those who fought for the Emperor, but at another it is an unashamed celebration of militarism. In the grounds you can find a monument to the Kempeitai – it is like seeing a memorial to the Gestapo in a German Cathedral and the first engine that ran on the Thai-Burmese railway.

The film climaxes with the older Lomax confronting the Japanese interpreter who watched over his torture.

Life after Kony (2013)
Directed by Will Storr
This review is based on an article in The Observer Magazine (12 January 2013) entitled ‘Life after Kony: survivors of the world’s worst warlord tell their stories’. It reports on work being supported by Christian Aid.

Two short films can be viewed on the internet and there is an exhibition at Oxo Tower Wharf, London from 5 to 16 March.

One film ‘The rebel’ concerns Norman Okello who was abducted at just 12 years old. Still only a child, he was forced to and maim for the Lords Resistance Army. Reunited with his family as a teenager, the former child soldier tells of the constant struggle he faced to hold onto his humanity.

The other is about Deo Komakech who is a ‘massacre scoper’ in northern Uganda. His team carries out extensive research and precise mapping of atrocities committed by the LRA and the government of Uganda. Deo’s work is carried out at the National Memory and Peace Documentation Centre and funded by the Refugee Law Project which seeks to ensure human rights for refugees and displaced persons and address the legacy of conflict. It also plans to provide reconstructive surgery for some of those mutilated by the LRA.

For more information on the films go to christianaid.org.uk/in-kony’s-shadow and theguardian.com/video.

The act of killing (2013)
Directed by Joshua Oppenheimer
Surprisingly this film was chosen as first of the top ten films chosen by Guardian critics (G2 Films and music, 20 December 2013). It also had a surprising impact in the US.

Indonesia’s military coup in 1965 ushered in the rule of Major General Suharto, after a purge during which approximately 500,000 people were murdered as alleged communists by paramilitaries and mobsters. Its memory is reawakened by this documentary film which is at times unwatchably explicit. Oppenheimer tracks down the ageing and entirely unrepentant perpetrators and invites them to re-enact their most grisly escapades in the style of their favourite movies. It is a situationist nightmare that flings the evil in our faces – and finally in their faces too.

Unlike the wholesale brutalities in say, Cambodia or Bosnia or Rwanda, where there has been a flawed but reasonably well understood institutional attempt to come to terms with the past, the deaths in Indonesia are not officially considered anything to be ashamed of. There is no historical process.

Oppenheimer gives the gushingly cheerful killers an opportunity to revive their most atrocious crimes of torture and mayhem in the style of the gangster-flicks, westerns, war movies and musicals they adore. He gives them more than enough rope to hang themselves. The bad guys are the willing participants and do so in the sense that the bad guys are often the more charismatic figures in movies.

As the movie proceeds, the tension builds. Will these people realise what we realise? Will they twist, on a simple level, how they are going to be represented in the film? It is a gut-churning film – a radical dive into history.

(Based on a review by Peter Bradshaw.)
‘The foolishness seems to be down to those who wish to politicise the history and gain campaigning points.’

Politics is becoming a stranger’ said David Aaronovich recently in the The Times. ‘It now looks as though one of the issues at the next election is going to be the causes of the First World War.’

Why has a war a hundred years ago generated so much political heat and media coverage in this country? And why is the British peace movement investing so much time and effort in the issue, particularly when the landscape of war is now fundamentally different as discussed by Rowan Williams in our opening article; and when there are so many real and potential conflicts in the world to address?

The foolishness seems to be down to those who wish to politicise the history and gain campaigning points; such that their ideological concerns are crowding out the need for a simple programme of events.

Clearly some commoration is desirable both at a personal and national level to remember those whose lives were affected by the war, especially relatives and those who held courageous convictions which we share. But isn’t this what the country does on Remembrance Sunday each year and the peace movement at events such as International Conscientious Objectors Day. Wouldn’t a few additional events to commemorate special dates over the next four years be enough?

Any further value of the WW1 history rests on the extent to which it informs our response to conflict in today’s world or teaches our children how to see more clearly why the world is as it is. But again, this is happening fairly regularly in our schools, in documentary programmes and museum exhibitions, to say nothing of the many books, plays and films on the subject, some of which are well-known features of our popular culture.

What is said and taught will never meet everyone’s precise interpretation of the facts – history is not like that - but in an open society where such information is not censored, one can be sure that any significant distortion will be rebutted. For an education secretary to push his own favoured interpretation of history as the truth and to dismiss the views of others is almost wilfully silly. It was bound to draw criticism from the experts.

The same willfulness applies to the radical left of the anti-war movement which has reacted vehemently to the Government’s plan for commemoration which they say will simply be a promotion of militarism (although there is no evidence to support this view).

Their response is to condemn the origins of the war as an imperial conspiracy and its conduct as a criminal act by incompetent military hierarchy. Unfortunately, the effect is to reinforce the view that the lefties are extreme and biased because most people know that the story is not that simple (a point that is being strongly reinforced by popular historians in books and documentaries).

To avoid the same impression, our main stream movement has to be careful about the way it expresses opinions about the war: an attitude of critical awareness and discernment about what is said is probably our best approach. We should also remember that we can demonstrate the futility of war using recent events that are less contentious and generally accepted.

Facts, interpretations and myths

Putting aside the campaigning aspects, the movement does have a role in telling the story about the few who spoke out against the war and those who refused enlistment. Their stories are important and need to be set alongside those who did believe it was right to fight for king and country. The facts should be presented fairly with an understanding that despite the horrific slaughter, instances of loyalty to the cause, and unwavering bravery in the face of impossible odds, remain vastly more numerous and sometimes more compelling than the occasions of dissent. The army held its shape, and the country kept its faith, right through to the bitter end of the war. The objectors were brave and sensible and far-sighted and (it is reasonable to argue) right. But they can hardly be said to have ‘divided Britain’.

When telling the wider story it is important to remember that there is a key difference between myths, which can be disproved by evidence, and interpretations which take evidence into account. Margaret MacMillan (see Book Look) indicates that historians have demolished the myth, for instance, that all Europeans welcomed war with cheering and flowers. We know that across the continent, the public mood was much more a mix of fear, apprehension and resignation; and in some cases, exhilaration that the storm so long anticipated had finally broken.

However, unlike WW2, there is no clear consensus about the origins of WW1 or who was responsible: Max Hastings, David Reynolds and indeed Margaret MacDonald give different interpretations in their recent books (see Book look here and in the last issue of TAP). But, then history is all about disagreements and the encouragement of discussion of the past can only enhance our understanding.

Education in schools

This is a key area for the peace movement, although many schools can be uneasy about inviting speakers from campaigning organisations. It is easier for an organisation like The Peace Museum which aims to keep an open, independent position and educational role and we have referred particularly to its Choices project on page 4 (or 5) which is an exemplary use of historical information.

The point of studying history is neither to honour or denigrate our ancestors but to understand how it shaped the world. The understanding changes as our world changes. For example, it is impossible to comprehend the resilience of the project for European unity, even after the near collapse of the euro, without some grasp of the effect of the continents two 20th century wars. Then, of course, decisions taken about the Middle East haunt us until this day and The Balfour Declaration should be at the heart of any debate about the repercussions of the war. Consider the rise of Wahhabi Islam and the provision of a home for the Jewish. Thus attitudes to the so called ‘war against terror’ are also important here and the Choices project uses this as a comparator with some of the dilemmas of WW1. The lesson of history is that everything leads onto something else.

Let us end with some remarks from Michael Morpurgo the writer of ‘War horse’ who has probably done more than most writers to educate young people. He says this in a recent Guardian article where he talks about his family reflection of WW1.

To tell the story is the only way we have left to remember, and the only way to pass it on. And it is important to pass it on, important for the men who died on all sides, all unknown soldiers, for those who suffered long afterwards and grieved all their lives. And important for us too. If they gave their todays for our tomorrows, then, I am sure, after all they went through, and died for, they would wish to see us doing all we can to create a world of peace and goodwill,

‘The foolshness seems to be down to those who wish to politicise the history and gain campaigning points.’
We have to ask whether a Security Council made up of militarised countries is the appropriate basis to consult on international conflict.

one sovereign state. It moves its operation around with great rapidity and surprising sophistication. So, whose job is it to deal with the LRA? To whom will any sovereign state involved be willing to yield its own control in order to get to an effective regional response? A particularly sharp case, I mentioned, partly because some countries in Africa with which I have been most involved over the years, not least the Congo and Sudan, are ones that have suffered most from the LRA’s depredations.

This is not only a military question. How we manage an effective response to for example internationally diffused epidemics or internationally operationally environmental crises pose something of the same set of problems. Sovereignty is a problem here and we need to think very hard about how the yielding of this might be thought through and brought about in particular circumstances. It raises some issues about the UN and other international bodies to which I will return to in a moment.

The third thing that comes into focus is the equally complex cluster of questions about the arms trade. How do we create effective international instruments for control of the arms trade? If we are serious about the yielding of sovereignty in certain circumstances, this is surely one of the areas where it has to take effect. And we have already seen some small steps in this direction. The small arms convention, for example, which requires that the source of arms is declared, is one of the rather fragile bastions against the spread of child soldiering. If it can be done with small arms, exactly how does it work with other kinds of weaponry? Is there going to be any international enforceable clarity on cluster bombs to take one example? Is drone warfare another area in which we ought to looking to this type of question?

My fourth point is one which picks up this set of issues about the UN and its international instruments. We have to ask whether a Security Council made up of militarised countries is the appropriate basis to consult on international conflict. I wonder whether we should recast this question completely and ask whether it is not time to have a mediation council instead. Should we identify a number of demilitarised and non-aligned nations who can regularly be called upon for mediation activities? To some extent, this already happens.

The role of Norway, for example in the recent conflict in Sri Lanka has been limited but significant. Is it possible to think about a more intentional approach to the question which looks towards a UN mediation council where a number of nations are designated to having the capability to build up skills and advise of issues of legality that might arise?

Two more points arise. I mentioned the undeniable fact that unless things change rather dramatically, some of the major conflicts in the future will be about resources. In other words, the moral map on conflict has to factor in environmental sustainability. Unless we resolve some of the potentially burgeoning bloody conflicts about access to clean water and disease, we can expect more and worse wars. Thus the link between environmental ethics and war take us most uncomfortably into the area of effective international instruments and what constitutes national sovereignty and effective international institutes.

And my final point under this head is one which arises out of looking at a series of local internecine conflicts especially in Africa. In the last few years, I and some of my colleagues have been looking fairly intensively at conflicts in Nigeria, being briefed regularly on developments and trying to broker some local initiatives there. The conflicts in northern Nigeria particularly are quite frequently presented simply as Christian and Muslim conflicts but this is not very helpful in understanding what is going on. Nor is it helpful to see them as tribal conflicts. The most insightful interpretation of this tragedy lies in the increasing number of rootless and unemployed young males who are increasingly detached from tribal forms of authority and norms of behaviour. They have few prospects for employment and economic stability and are drawn inexorably into violent conflict. As is the case for environmental issues, if we are not ready to tackle this we can expect more bloody new wars. It implies a carefully thought through programme for creating options for such young men.

Those six areas which I have summarised - the Augustinian point about not delegitimising ourselves by the methods we use, clarity about limits of sovereignty, stringency about the arms trade, identifying countries that might be long term mediators, tackling the resource question and creating opportunities for a rootless young generation - all of these in their way have their roots in some of the points that I made about the Just War. In other words to regard these as part of the ethical response to new wars is not to overturn or ignore the Just War theory but to pick up its principles and see them in another light. The search for alternatives to violence is part of finding a better focus for mediation and avoiding war.

Bringing all this together

I am not proposing a comprehensive moral response to the tangled web of new patterns of warfare. I am though suggesting that if my analysis is correct and that new wars are not covered well by the classical Just War theory, we need to dig deeper within those classical principles and find what exactly they rest upon, what they assume to be possible and necessary in response to violence. Out of that we need to distil some of the priorities for an effective international response to locally spiralling conflict. 'We must not underrate the urgency of this. In the last decade or so we have seen off the cuff moral responses particularly the erosion and suspension of ordinary norms of the great range of civil liberties. I am not necessarily suggesting that these are unintelligible responses to great instability and fear, but I am suggesting that knee jerk, short term responses to the questions are not what we need. I believe that CCADD and the Department of War Studies at Kings College and all those that are deeply concerned with finding responsible, defensible responses have the task before them of attempting to distil further some of these more broad ranging, slightly more adaptable principles and priorities and recommend them, before it is not too late, to those who make political decisions about the conflicts of our time. To those whose responsibility it is to secure a safe future for the next generation of the human race.

a world that one day will turn its back on war for good. It is through their words and our stories that we must and will remember this and remember them. Then we really will be honouring their memory.

These final words are from ‘Only Remembered’, by John Tams, the song that begins and ends the National Theatre’s play of ‘War Horse’.

“Only the truth that in life we have spoken, Only the seed that in life we have sown; These shall pass onwards when we are forgotten, Only remembered for what we have done, Only remembered, only remembered, Only remembered for what we have done.”
1914–18 will be marked with many memorials. It is good that this should happen – the appalling slaughter, the result of a failure of imperial leadership, should not be forgotten. But how should the centenary of the First World War be remembered? Not as many would have it, in pious nationalist tones with immense sorrow and an ungrounded commitment against future wars.

Enter ‘Gentle men’, now a double CD featuring a number of well-known British musicians. The song cycle was initiated in 1977 – before the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan were envisaged – by Robb Johnson as a memorial to his grandfathers, who are pictured in uniform on the CD cover. Re-recorded with an expanded cast of musicians, ‘Gentle men’ is a vivid retelling of the conflict – from the point of view of the combatants and their families – and of life after the war. With sparse instrumentation – pianos, some muted brass, and the feeling is intimate. The horror on ‘Deeper than dugouts’ and sense of loss on ‘Dead men’s pennies’ is immense. At times, the quietly music-hall feeling is redolent of the powerful 1960s satire ‘Oh! What a lovely war!’ but that is all to the good, for Gentle men is much about humans who were torn apart in the Great War as a recognition of contemporary conflict.

Catalyst: ‘Contemporary art and war’

Conflict has long been a muse for artists and photographers. From Elizabeth Thompson’s vivid depictions of Napoleonic battlefields to Don McCullin’s haunting, violent encapsulations of the Vietnam War, scenes of battle continue to fascinate and inspire.

This new exhibition at the Imperial War Museum North explores how war has been a crucial subject for contemporary artists in the last two decades. ‘Catalyst’ examines the rich and varied artistic response to conflict in the media age, the ways in which art can prompt us to think more deeply about current events, their immediate impact, and their long-term implications. It contains works by more than 40 contemporary artists about war in our time. The aim is to illustrate how artists contribute to our perceptions of war and conflict in an age where our understanding is shaped by the media and not the least the internet. To the latter, Peter Kennard’s work ‘Photo Op’ refers to this photo composition, well-known through the web, showing Tony Blair doing a ‘selfie’ (web slang for a posted self-portrait, quickly made by one’s mobile phone) in front of an apocalyptic landscape.

John Timberlake’s ‘Another country’ series began with a painted backdrop, combining well-known Romantic landscapes by Turner or Constable with nuclear mushroom clouds taken from source in IWM’s archives. He then constructed models with plastic spectators and photographed the resulting diorama. Through the photographs he explores ideas about landscape and the modern-day sublime, a term used to describe entities that are both terrifying and awe-inspiring. The multiple layers in the work remove us from the event, leaving us as passive spectators, simultaneously seduced and disturbed.

This exhibition is at the Imperial War Museum North in Manchester until 23 February 2014.

Terror words can’t describe

The Maltese-American cartoonist Joe Sacco has created a panorama of the first day of the battle of the Somme. His touchstone as he sketched it was the Bayeaux tapestry, and the references to medieval art in his own epic are clear to see. He has dispensed completely with perspective and realistic proportion – a few inches in the drawing might represent a hundred yards or a mile of reality; and as a result, time shifts queasily even as it teems with bodies.

The reader’s eye doesn’t dart quickly across the pages, pulled along by a sense of narrative; rather, we are invited to look closely at every inch of every page, and its only in the intense inspection that the horror hits. Over there, an officer quietly vomits. Over here, a horse is put out of its misery. And in this corner, a soldier twists on a stretcher, his arms thrown out in front of him as if he wants nothing more than to embrace death.

So many incomprehensible decisions and so much unfathomable destruction reduced to just 24 plates holds something awesome about this; and pitiful too.